Tom Ritter

Not doing tech stuff for a month, skimming twitter for 10 min every 2 days. Feel free, encouraged even, to @/DM/chat me things I should read

Fuzzing RTSP to discover an exploitable vulnerability in VLC http://isecpartners.github.io/fuzzing/vulnerabilities/2013/12/30/vlc-vulnerability.html …

@nadiaheninger I appreciate you explaining Cryptopocalypse well, and not buying into the media's wording :)

vtable protections. Can we have both speed and thoroughness? http://scarybeastsecurity.blogspot.com/2013/12/vtable-protections-fast-and-thorough.html …

Chinese Great Firewall Wikipedia Rules by @SummerAgony - what China blocks on wikipedia: http://goo.gl/u971J7  http://goo.gl/zKslcu 

Troubled that @CiscoSecurity has made available DPI rules to block @PsiphonInc based on its various handshakes. http://tools.cisco.com/security/center/viewIpsSignature.x?signatureId=2336&signatureSubId=0 …

Got a nice letter from #RSAC asking me to reconsider the pulling of the talk and linking to the press release. Nope, sorry but nope.

Excited that iSEC will be helping in the audit of Truecrypt: http://isecpartners.github.io/news/2013/12/23/iSEC-Engages-In-Truecrypt-Audit.html … http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/an-update-on-truecrypt.html …

@thegrugq @justintroutman as far as sha256, I'd dig in & figure out default. I kind of like SHA384, but it's preference not recommendation

@thegrugq @justintroutman Not familiar enough with XTS to know for sure. Quite possibly, but I'd probably pick it just because

@thegrugq @justintroutman https://code.google.com/p/cryptsetup/wiki/DMCrypt … aes-xts-essiv is what I would Google to confirm is good.

@TomRittervg Not standard but easy to implement. However, the sudden-death counter reuse is probably fatal: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/484.pdf 

@TomRittervg A reason to use forward-secure signature schemes for code signing, perhaps?

@agl__ That _sounds_ sexy, but are any standardized, easy enough to implement, and more likely to be deployed than counter-timestamping?

NSA proving difficulty of code signing revoking: At what date should we invalidate signatures of stolen cert? (Assuming counter-timestamps)

.@thegrugq XEX/XTS specs are at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf … http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38E/nist-sp-800-38E.pdf … and the Elephant paper is good overview of problem space

.@thegrugq However XTS is not AEAD, may be vulnerable to watermarking/other attack? Bitlocker uses Elephant Diffuser http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/2/3/0238acaf-d3bf-4a6d-b3d6-0a0be4bbb36e/BitLockerCipher200608.pdf …

@thegrugq XTS is new default, not vulnerable according to blog. "systems w/ FDE installed w/ 12.04 or earlier are potentially vulnerable"

An impressive attack on LUKS demonstrating backdooring an encrypted volume in a manner other than bootloader http://www.jakoblell.com/blog/2013/12/22/practical-malleability-attack-against-cbc-encrypted-luks-partitions/ …

I hadn't seen news report that DUAL_EC_DRBG as backdoored in '04. I find that part very interesting. @matthew_d_green @mattblaze